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Successful implementation of the Functional Safety standards, IEC-61508 and IEC-61511 (or 
ANSI/ISA 84), begins with robust management planning. The Functional Safety Lifecycle 
includes activities at all stages of a process lifespan, including conception of a project, hazards 
identification, specification, design and implementation, verification and validation, operation 
and maintenance, and modification and decommissioning. Each phase of the lifecycle has 
specific requirements for the activities that must be completed, goals to be achieved by those 
activities and expectations of the documentation. The standards are performance based, so for a 
turnkey project, the path to compliance is defined by the project engineering management firm. 
A written Functional Safety Management Plan (FSMP) defines the desired path and success 
metrics to ensure functional safety objectives are met at all stages of the lifecycle. This paper 
will review the requirements for functional safety management planning, and share the 
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Modern functional safety standards were first issued in the late 90s and are now evolving to 
second generation. Regrettably, nearly 20 years later, industry is still learning to apply them 
effectively. IEC-61511, adopted in the United States as ANSI/ISA 84 - 2004, defines practices 
intended to ensure the safety of industrial processes through use of Safety Instrumented Systems 
(SIS) to reduce risk. OSHA has cited ANSI/ISA 84 as a Recognized And Generally Accepted 
Good Engineering Practice (RAGAGEP) for implementation of SIS. End users expect 
engineering teams to be as expert in implementation of functional safety standards as they are 
with any other RAGAGEP standard. Unfortunately, flaws exist in project execution that saddle 
end users with non-compliant systems and un-mitigated risk. 
 ANSI/ISA 84-2004 (IEC61511 Mod) states “Safety planning shall take place to define the 
activities that are required to be carried out along with the persons, department, organization or 
other units responsible to carry out these activities. This planning shall be updated as necessary 
throughout the entire safety life cycle”.1 Unfortunately, many organizations do not include 
development of an overall Functional Safety Management Plan (FSMP) in scope, so capital 
projects often lack big picture guidance. Even in the absence of an FSMP, adherence to the 
balance of the engineering design standards is expected, but is often not delivered. The 
engineering design firms’ project, to design and construct a green-field nitrogen fertilizer plant in 
Iowa, is an example.  This paper will share some of the lessons learned and how gaps may have 
been avoided with a comprehensive FSMP. 
  
Background 
The project, to engineer, procure and construct a world scale, green-field, nitrogen fertilizer 
facility in Iowa, was structured with a common project execution model. Contracted by a global 
producer of fertilizers and industrial chemicals, a project management team and multiple 
engineering design firms were to deliver a turnkey facility. Contract documents include two 
requirements key to the discussion in this paper: 1) the project is to comply with ANSI/ISA 84-
2004 and 2) a four-year shutdown cycle for maintenance is expected. The technology providers 
had primary process design responsibility and a small team from corporate operations provided 
project reviews.  Design responsibilities were distributed between technology providers based 
upon process area. The design basis was fixed (e.g. Rev 0 or higher P&IDs), and construction in 
progress when the site operations team was assembled.  
Prior to start-up the site operations team completed a thorough review of the design documents, 
conducted a HAZOP of record, and subsequent LOPA. These efforts identified potential gaps 
raising questions about the adequacy of the SIS. Specific concerns included potential for 
previously unidentified risk, insufficiently mitigated risk, and incomplete implementation of the 




Requirements of the Standard 
ANSI/ISA 84-2004 is an adoption of IEC 61511 edition 1.0, with a minor modification to the 
scope.  IEC 61511 was written by end users for end users. It is a non-prescriptive, performance-
based standard that states requirements, but does not explicitly define how to implement them. 
Clause 4, Conformance to this International Standard, states: 
“To conform to this International Standard, it shall be shown that each of the requirements 
outlined in Clauses 5 through 19 has been satisfied to the defined criteria and therefore the clause 
objective(s) has(have) been met.”2  
 
 Clauses 5 -18 describe the objectives and requirements for the phases of the lifecycle. Clause 19 
describes the objectives and requirements for information and documentation. To achieve 
compliance, users must understand the requirement of the standard and define their own 
procedures and process to meet the requirements. 
Clause 5 introduces the lifecycle and includes the general requirement of the standard, including; 
 Requirement for a management system 
 Organization, responsibility and resource competency 
 Risk evaluation and risk management 
 Planning 
 Implementation and monitoring 
 Assessment, auditing and revision 
 Configuration management 
Clause 6 details the functional safety lifecycle model, which organizes required activities into 
phases, illustrates the relationship between the phases, and establishes five assessment points 




   
Figure 1.  SIS Safety Lifecycle Phases 
 
Clause 6 also includes a table that defines objectives for each phase, identifies clause (8-18) 
where requirements are stated, and summarizes the information and documentation inputs and 
outputs for the phase.    
Planning is a required activity for all phases of the lifecycle and is a key step to establishing the 
scope, methodology, tools and acceptance criteria that characterize compliance. The objective of 
the planning process is to assure the activities of each phase of the lifecycle meet the 
requirements of the standard. This includes: 
 the design basis and performance requirements and specification documentation;  
 system testing and maintenance to assure continued reliability; and,  
 documentation and analysis of performance records to confirm safety integrity is 
achieved. 
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When lifecycle activities are executed over a long period of time and by multiple teams, as is 
typical in large capital projects, the planning and execution activities will be recorded in many 
documents. In addition, there will be numerous procedures, work instructions, forms and records 
that support implementation of the plan. Periodic assessments (Functional Safety Audit) are 
required to confirm compliance.  Table 1 is a summary of documents an assessor would expect 
to find as supporting evidence of lifecycle activities.  
Document Type Examples : Characteristics 
Policy level Plan Functional Safety Management Plan Philosophy:  
Defines the high level criteria for compliance such as applicable 
standards, roles and responsibilities, competency requirements, 
methodology & tools, workflow, schedule, documentation requirements, 
acceptance criteria and metrics. This document should set detailed 
parameters where they are important for detailed design. (e.g. proof test 
interval, maintenance philosophy ) 
Project Plan(s) Project Execution Plan(s), Quality Management Plan(s), Risk 
Management Plan, Testing, Verification & Plan, Construction 
Management Plan: 
Defines the execution plan and quality control approach for parties 
conducting scope of work associated with the Safety Instrumented 
System (SIS). 
Procedures Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) Procedure, Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 
Selection Procedure, SIL Verification Procedure, Document Control 
Procedure: 
Detailed procedures for executing specific activities supporting the plan. 
Some will be global to be used by all (e.g. SIL verification procedure), 
others may be specific to a particular party (e.g. document control). 
Work Instructions Factory Acceptance Test (FAT) Procedure, Site Acceptance/Integration 
(SAT/SIT) Test Plan, Proof Test Procedures: 
Detailed instructions for executing a particular task, in a specific 
situation. Some are developed for a single use (e.g. FAT), while others 
are developed for repeated use (e.g. proof tests). 
Specifications SIF Safety Requirements Specification (SRS), Logic Solver SRS, 
Instrument and valve data sheets, equipment data sheets, typical 
installation details: 
Documents that specific the design, purchasing and installation 
requirements for the SIS and it’s components. 
Forms & Records P&IDs, Logic Diagrams, verification reports, audit reports, inspection 
and proof test logs, training & competency records, non-conformance 
resolution log: 
Documents that record the basis for design (a.k.a. process safety 
information), conformance to requirements (e.g. training & competency 
logs) and records that document the testing and performance of the SIS 
and its components. 




Five functional safety assessment stages are identified in the standard; however, in ISA 84-2004, 
only one is required. The stage 3 assessment is conducted between the Installation, 
Commissioning and Validation and the Operating and Maintenance phases. All phases of the 
lifecycle prior to operation and maintenance are evaluated for compliance. Management and 
Assessment, Planning and Verification phases are evaluated for full compliance with prior 
phases, and planning requirements for future phases. The compliance criteria of a stage 3 
assessment, is applied to the project observations within the balance of this paper. 
 
Hazards Identification, SIL Assessment and SRS Development 
The first three steps in the functional safety lifecycle are hazards identification, allocation of 
safety functions to protection layers, and preparation of a SRS. In this project the methods 
utilized in the first two steps were accepted methods, but not necessarily the best choices to 
establish Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) requirements for a highly integrated continuous 
process. The third step, SRS development was entirely omitted.  
A SIS is comprised of a logic solver and many SIF interlocks. Individual SIFs are designed to 
mitigate the risks associated with a particular hazard scenario. Successful implementation of a 
SIS begins with SIL selection and establishment of the SIL target for each SIF. There are a 
number of methods available, each with strengths and weaknesses. A FSMP and/or supporting 
procedures should define what methods are to be used, and stipulate risk assessment criteria. The 
choice of SIL assessment method may have an influence on the SIL verification method/criteria, 
so a lifecycle view should be taken to pair methods appropriately. For example, a semi-
qualitative method of SIL assessment should be paired with a SIL verification approach setting a 
minimum threshold within the SIL band (i.e. 30%). 
Project phase HAZOPs and SIL Selection were completed by the two technology provider teams 
with corporate operations participation in all process reviews. HAZOP and SIL assessment 
reports for four process areas and numerous machine packages identified SIFs during the project. 
Operation HAZOPs and SIL Selection were completed 3-3.5 years after the project reviews with 
a fresh team. Operations HAZOP methodology was consistent with the project HAZOP. Both 
teams used different, but still acceptable SIL assessment methods, each having their own 
advantages, disadvantages, and verification considerations. 
The project SIL assessment was performed by the engineering firms used a semi-qualitative four 
parameter, calibrated risk-graph method. Each parameter is divided into 2-6 rank groups 
considering consequence (4), occupancy (2), avoid-ability (2) and frequency of hazard (3, 6). 
Users assign parameter rank for each group to scenarios then step through a decision tree, similar 
to the one in Figure 2, to assign SIL target. The method has the advantage of being easy to use. 
The disadvantages are:  
 the method is applied to individual cause/consequence pairs;  
 assessment of safeguard effectiveness is minimal; outcome consistency relies on 
subjectivity of the users; and,  
 
 
 results indicate SIL band but not relative position within the band.  
For this reason, the assessment method should be paired with an appropriate SIL verification 
threshold to assure risk reduction targets are met.  
 
Figure 2.  Example Risk-graph3 
 
The site operations team elected to use quantitative Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) 
methodology for SIL assessment. This method is consequence based and considers multiple 
scenarios with the potential for a common consequence together. For a given consequence, a 
matrix is prepared listing potential initiating events (causes) vs. safeguards based on the HAZOP 
record.  LOPA: 
 defines individual probability for the initiating events;  
 evaluates each safeguard for independence;  
 assigns a probability of failure (PFD) for the independent protection layer (IPL); and, 
 applies to the causes where the IPL may be effective.  
The method is best applied by a trained team with calibrated rules for assigning frequency and 
probability. Key advantages of the method are that it delivers a SIL target with specified residual 
risk reduction factor (RRF) and the cumulative SIF demand rate is determined based on all 
potential causes. SIL verification is provided with a quantitative demand rate and specific PFD 
 
 
target. Figure 3 illustrates a LOPA with three Initiating Events (IE), one IPL applicable to all 
IEs, an IPL and Conditional Modifier (CM) that apply to a single IPL each. Frequencies for IEs 
are set, PFDs for IPLs and CMs are assigned, then PFD for the SIF is calculated to reduce risk to 
the tolerable frequency. This example yields a SIF with PFD of 8.5E-3, or a SIL 2 SIF with 
minimum required RRF of 118. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Example LOPA 
 
During the operations LOPA the team defined a class of IPL identified as a Critical Protection 
Interlock (CPI). A CPI is an interlock that performs as an IPL, with a maximum PFD of 0.1, and 
is executed in the Basic Process Control System (BPCS) or a package control logic solver. CPIs 
are non-SIF IPLs. Application of CPIs in the LOPA reduced the number of SIFs significantly. 
Differences in the HAZOP team perspective, and the SIL assessment methodologies, coupled 
with the definition of CPI, resulted in a significant change in the SIF count and SIL target levels.  
SIL target distribution for the two teams are summarized in Table 2. 
 
 Method SIL 3 SIL2 SIL1 CPI Total 
Project Risk-graph 5 44 159 0 208 
Operations LOPA 0 19 53 108 180 
Table 2.  SIL Target Distribution 
 
Applying the LOPA approach to SIL targeting highlighted a discrepancy in determination of SIF 
mode. Demand is the frequency at which condition(s) may occur that cause the SIF to initiate. 
Frequency of proof test, or Proof Test Interval (PTI), must also be considered when determining 
SIF operating mode. SIFs may operate in low demand, high demand or continuous modes. Mode 
of operation dictates different verification, operation and maintenance requirements. Risk-graph 
method considers single cause/consequence pairs so SIFs are commonly assumed to be operating 
in low demand mode, based upon the frequency assigned to the initiating event. The project team 
 
 
evaluated the design based on an annual PTI and used the risk-graph method. Initiating events 
were considered separately, so all SIFs were identified as low demand. The operations team 
considered multiple initiating events in the LOPA and set PTI based on the planned 4 year 
operating shutdown schedule. This resulted in the operating team identifying a number of high 
demand SIFs that were unrecognized by the project team. In addition, many SIFs were 
determined to have residual RRF requirements, some quite significant (e.g. SIL 2 RRF 303). 
Table 3 summarizes SIF mode and residual risk requirements identified by the LOPA. 
 
 SIL 2 SIL 1 Total 
Low Demand 3 24 27 
Low Demand with residual RRF 5 2 7 
High Demand 0 7 7 
High Demand with residual RRF 11 20 31 
Table 3.  SIF Mode Distribution 
 
The operations SIL assessment effort resulted in a reduction in the SIF count, separation of SIFs 
into two categories (SIF and CPI) and identification of high demand mode SIFs. In addition, the 
sensor and final elements included in the interlock definition of safe state was updated. 
ANSI/ISA 84 (IEC-61511) requires that a SRS be developed to define requirements for each 
function and the overall SIS performance. The standard includes an extensive list of items that 
are to be specified. The project team prepared the SRS for the logic solver performance, but only 
defined a few of the requirements for each SIF. Examples of SRS detail that were missing 
include: 
 the requirements for common cause failure,  
 SIF response time,  
 process safety time,  
 manual shutdown,  
 reset, and  
 override/inhibit/bypass function.   
The SRS is used to assure suitable devices can be selected for SIF service, and it defines 
acceptance criteria for verification and validation activities. To address this gap, site operations 
separately commissioned the development of SIF SRS prior to startup. Unfortunately, the SRS 
was developed long after the design and procurement was complete, and construction was in an 
advanced stage, so implementation is a costly re-work effort. 
 
Design and Engineering 
Since SRS documents were not prepared to describe SIF design requirements, the requirements 
were not fully incorporated into the design. For example, the instrument and valve data sheets 
simply indicate something like ‘transmitter shall be SIL 2 certified’, or contain no indication of 
SIL requirements at all. This resulted in the procurement of unsuitable devices, which had to be 
 
 
replaced, or required proven in use justification.  Logic diagrams and loop sheets do not 
differentiate between safety and non-safety functions, therefore, the logic is not separated, so all 
logic in the SIS “shall be treated as part of the SIS and comply with the requirements for the 
highest SIL”4. Treating all logic in the SIS to the highest rigor will add cost to all future 
maintenance and modification efforts. In addition, the SIF requirements were not communicated 
to package vendors so multiple package systems failed to meet reliability targets. 
In absence of a FSMP and SRS, SIL verification was performed inconsistently across the project 
areas; one team used a simplified methodology, and the other used Markov models. Both teams 
assumed 1 year proof test intervals, even though the plant is intended to operate on a 4 year 
turnaround cycle. Verification parameters, such as proof test interval, proof test coverage and 
time to restore, varied significantly and was often overly optimistic. Project documentation had 
no specific criteria noted to vet reported failure rate data for reasonableness and seek evidence 
that ‘certificates’ were prepared by an entity accredited in the IEC 61508 certification 
methodology. 
 Site operations decided to have verification calculations repeated using a single methodology 
and consistent basis. Three hurdles must be met in SIL verification; probability of failure 
(PFDavg or PFH), Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) (redundancy), and systematic capability. 
More than half the SIFs failed to meet target SIL or HFT on initial recalculation. Systematic 
capability was rarely achieved due to the number of non-certified devices requiring proven in use 
justification. Immediate corrections were made where possible.  Where corrective action 
required more time to implement, a short term mitigation plan was developed to allow 
production to be started using the devices procured by the project. Complete mitigation will 
require a shutdown within the first year to implement the long-term mitigation plan. Costs for 
replacing components and completing an early shutdown will pale in comparison with the cost of 
the lost revenue.  
Functional safety scope for the project includes three SIS logic solvers, housing a final total of 
72 SIFs with 267 unique tags. Each tag represents a field device assembly made up of 2-5 
components per assembly. (For example, a valve tag assembly includes the solenoid, actuator, 
valve and sometimes a positioner.)  Seventy-seven percent of the procured components are not 
certified. Non-certified devices will be replaced with certified devices, where necessary (and 
possible). Proven in use justification must be prepared for remaining non-certified devices. The 
long-term mitigation plan includes: 
 Replace transmitters, solenoids, actuators and valves assemblies with certified devices 
 Certify valve and/or valve/actuator assemblies 
 Perform a Failure Mode, Effects & Diagnostic Analysis (FMEDA) to determine model 
specific failure rates and complete proven in use justification for valve and/or valve/ 
actuator assemblies 
 Add new certified transmitters, solenoid, actuator and valves to provide redundancy 
 Rebuild selected large valves at increased intervals 
 Certify or proven in use for multiple vendor package PLCs 
 Perform proven in use justification for non-certified devices 
 
 
Action plan to certify or perform FMEDA on a device does not guarantee all issues will be 
resolved. Should these devices not perform to the required reliability level, then additional 
mitigation may be necessary. For non-certified devices, proven in use justification5 must be 
developed to document that the device failure rate and mode is consistent with expectations. 
Device performance history must be tracked and vendor input is often required. Developing a 
proven in use justification requires significant effort, and it may take years to develop an 
appropriate sized dataset. 
 
Installation, Commissioning and Validation 
A FSMP is to include planning for SIS verification, testing and validation. In absence of a 
FSMP, important testing activities, such as logic solver site acceptance test, site integration test 
and proof tests were not included in the installation, commissioning and pre-startup schedule. 
Proof test procedures were not included in the project turnover and had to be developed by site 
operations. Contract assistance was necessary to prepare proof test procedures on a fast track 
timeline so they would be available for pre-startup validation.  
Commissioning efforts included bench tests and continuity tests.  Logic was being modified 
during commissioning to address disconnects. To assure the proper performance of the SIFs, the 
site maintenance team completed proof tests and performed full-function trip tests. SIF response 
times were recorded and compared to the process safety times to validate adequate SIF response 
rate. Proof test calibrations discovered devices that were incorrectly calibrated, which indicated 
that bench calibration was inadequate. A number of SIF devices failed initial proof tests or failed 
soon after startup. In one case the percentage of devices that suffered early failure was 
uncomfortably high and the model (multiple devices, of the same model) was identified for 
replacement in all SIF applications. 
While the site maintenance team was performing the validation proof and trip test, they compiled 
component information that will be needed for operations and maintenance phases, and clearly 
tagged all components as safety devices. 
 
Operation and Maintenance 
The Iowa facility is in the first few months of operations and has little site specific maintenance 
history at this point. Initial training was completed for operating and maintenance personnel. 
SAP asset, reliability and maintenance systems have been populated including proof test 
scheduling. A Preventative Maintenance asset management system has been developed with SIF 
devices classified at the highest level of criticality for safety inspection compliance. The system 
documents proof tests inspection and repair information, which will begin to build proven in use 
documentation.   
Operation and maintenance planning is a work in progress. Once validation was completed, the 
site teams turned their attention to setting up systems to schedule and execute periodic proof 
 
 
tests, capture and analyze data on system demand and device performance, and manage change. 
Implementation of the long-term mitigation plan is in progress including development of a 
modification and decommissioning plan. Remaining gaps are being closed as they are identified. 
Development of a comprehensive site FSMP for future use, and establishment of an assessment 
and auditing program are on the horizon. Much work remains for the operations and maintenance 
teams to completely close the remaining functional safety lifecycle gaps. 
 
Conclusion 
End users rely upon engineering contractors to complete comprehensive planning, provide expert 
technical guidance and deliver projects that comply with standards and RAGAGEP. In the 
absence of a comprehensive FSMP and failure to follow the safety lifecycle, a project can 
experience costly gaps in functional safety management and fail to reduce process risk. 
Correcting the deficiencies in project execution is costly, time consuming, and may leave a 
facility with unmitigated risk for a considerable time. The IEC 61511 committee recognized 
industry is falling short and has strengthened the planning and execution requirements in the 
second edition. The changes include more specific language on the supplier responsibilities for 
planning and procedures, quantification of random failure, software development and testing, 
competency management, hardware fault tolerance, functional safety auditing, verification, 
traceability and cyber security. Hopefully the enhancements to the standard and experience 
lessons, such as those shared here, will encourage industry to increase focus on functional safety 
management planning at the project stage and improve compliance with functional safety 
standards in the future. 
 
Glossary 
BPCS Basic Process Control System 
CM Conditional Modifier 
CPI Critical Protection Interlock 
FAT Factory Acceptance Test 
FMEDA Failure Mode, Effects & Diagnostic Analysis 
FSMP Functional Safety Management Plan 
HAZOP HAZards and OPerability (study) 
HFT Hardware Fault Tolerance 
IE Initiating Event 
IPL Independent Protection Layer 
LOPA Layer of Protection Analysis 
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration 
P&ID Process & Instrumentation Diagram 
PFD Probability of Failure on Demand 
PHA Process Hazard Analysis 
 
 
PLC Programmable Logic Controller 
PTI Proof Test Interval 
REGAGEP Recognized and Generally Accepted Good 
Engineering Practice 
RRF Risk Reduction Factor 
SAT Site Acceptance Test 
SIF Safety Instrumented Function 
SIL Safety Integrity Level 
SIS Safety Instrumented Systems 
SIT Site Integration Test 





1 Instrument Society of America (ISA), ANSI/ISA-84.00.01-2004 part 1 (IEC61511-1 Mod) Functional Safety: 
Safety instrumented Systems for the Process Industry Sector – Part 1: Framework, Definitions, System, Hardware 
and Software Requirements. ISA, Clause 5.2.4. 
 
2 Instrument Society of America (ISA), ANSI/ISA-84.00.01-2004 part 1 (IEC61511-1 Mod) Functional Safety: 
Safety instrumented Systems for the Process Industry Sector – Part 1: Framework, Definitions, System, Hardware 
and Software Requirements. ISA, Clause 4. 
 
3 Instrument Society of America (ISA), ANSI/ISA-84.00.01-2004 part 3 (IEC61511-3 Mod) Functional Safety: 
Safety instrumented Systems for the Process Industry Sector – Part 3: Guidance for the Determination of the 
Required Safety Integrity Levels – Informative. ISA, Figure D.1 
 
4 Instrument Society of America (ISA), ANSI/ISA-84.00.01-2004 part 1 (IEC61511-1 Mod) Functional Safety: 
Safety instrumented Systems for the Process Industry Sector – Part 1: Framework, Definitions, System, Hardware 
and Software Requirements. ISA, Clause 11.2.2. 
 
5 Iwan van Beurden and Rachel Amkreutz, “‘Proven in use’ criteria for safety instrumented systems. Use these 
guidelines to qualify equipment.,” Hydrocarbon Processing November 2004. 





Denise Chastain-Knight, PE, CFSE, CCPSC 
exida 
80 North Main Street 




Iowa Fertilizer Co 
3546 180th Street 




Iowa Fertilizer Co 
3546 180th Street 
Wever, IA 52658 
william.donaldson@iowafertilizer.com 
 
